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The Storied Place 
Earth is a storied place. On other planets, so far as we know, there is little 
story, although they too have their astronomical records—events in their 
physics, chemistries, geomorphologies, meteorologies. Earth adds biol-
ogy and natural history; there is a cumulative historical evolution, coded in 
genes, lived out in each new generation, with novel mutants, varied 
genotypes becoming new phenotypes, and producing new chapters in the 
history. Genes remember, research, and recompound discoveries and the 
storied achievements, the values achieved, rise, over several billion years, 
to spectacular levels of attainment and power.  Past achievements are reca- 
pitulated in each present generation, with variations; and these results get 
tested in that generation and then folded into the future, resetting the 
initial conditions with new possibility spaces for development. 
Beyond natural history, Earth adds humans in their cultures, persons in 
their biographies, and now the story is stored in cumulative transmissible 
cultures, lived out in each present generation, as persons choose their ca- 
reers and have their adventures, form their nations and ideologies, and 
write new chapters in the story. Persons in their developing cultures are 
even more historical than the plants and animals in their evolutionary 
natural histories. The pace of change and the possibilities of innovation 
are accelerated by several orders of magnitude.  
Earth is the only place we know in which any living thing has a home 
territory. The logic of life is both biography and geography. The etymol- 
ogy of "bio-graphy" is to graph a life; the etymology of "geo-graphy" is to 
graph that life on Earth. "Biology" is the logic of life, but there is no 
logic of life that is not historical; and, in that sense, the idea of "graphing," 
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of drawing out a world line, biography, is more historical, better catching 
the logic of biology. Life is not a timeless syllogism; human life has to be 
distributed on Earth. Biology requires geography, graphing a world line, 
and biology plus geography yields history. Life is always taking a journey 
through time and place. 
Here we want to put persons in their places, in cultural history and, 
even more, in natural history. This emphasis is not because the latter is 
more important, but because it has been more neglected. Man is, Aristotle 
said, the political animal, the animal that builds a city. Yes, but humans 
are first and always earthlings too. We remain territorial animals. In find-
ing our place in the built environment, we have tended to get displaced 
from our natural environment. We ought to live in storied residence on 
landscapes. The logic of that home, the ecology, is finally narrative, and 
the human career is not a disembodied reason but a person organic in 
history. Character always takes narrative form; history is required to 
form character. The only history we humans know is as flesh and blood 
moves through time and space. So we cannot know who we are; we cannot 
know what is going on, until we know where life is taking place. Behind 
ethics is ethos, in the Greek, an accustomed mode of habitation. 
Natural History 
Nature generates; that is the root meaning of "nature," "to give birth." 
On Earth, nature launches life, located in cells, always embodied in indi-
viduals who are embedded in ecologies, and these ecologies undergo evo-
lutionary history. Storied residence does not begin with humans. Prehu-
man nature is already historical. At long ranges, evolutionary ecosystems 
have been spinning stories on Earth that are never twice the same. Only 
in a short-range perception is there seasonal recurrence, recycling, ho- 
meostasis, dependable patterns, repeated order. Words such as "homeo- 
stasis,"  "conservation," "preservation," "stability," or even  "species" 
and "ecosystem" are only penultimate in a metaphysics and an ethics of 
nature, although they are the words with which environmental philoso-
phy was launched. The ultimate word is "history." 
Humans awaken to their historical subjectivity in an already histori-
cally objective world. The genome is a historical genetic set, though with-
out historical awareness. Plants and animals are historical beings objec-
tively, although they do not know this subjectively. They do not know 
their own larger stories. Some animals have memories, precursors of his-
torical consciousness. But animals make no considered reflection on the 
historical character of their own natures, much less of nature, or culture. 
Humans are the only species that can become historians, or biologists, or 
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geographers, who can reflect over the history of life and its distribution 
over places over times. Humans have the opportunity to decipher natural 
history, as well as to remember their own cultural heritages. 
The story of applied science has been one of learning to remake the 
world in human interests, to use it resourcefully; but the story of pure 
science has been one of discovering the nature of nature, learning the 
natural history of sources we inherit. Early science thought this nature to 
be lawlike and repetitive, but recent science has learned the evolutionary 
Earth history. And life is still arriving. Earth is not so much a syllogism 
with premises and conclusions as a text to be interpreted. Like the books 
in our libraries, the landscapes are to be read, palimpsests of the past. 
Deep time and deep history lie behind and around us. Biological science 
has cleverly detected much of the past; it reads the story out of the histori-
cally produced landscapes, as well as the records left in the biomolecular 
genetic coding. Bioscience understands what is going on at present in 
terms of that past. 
But bioscience can present little theoretical argument explaining this 
history—little logic (tracking causes) by which there came to be a prime- 
val Earth, Precambrian protozoans, Cambrian trilobites, Triassic dino-
saurs, Eocene mammals, Pliocene primates, and Pleistocene Homo sapi-
ens. No theory exists, with initial conditions, from which these events 
follow as conclusions. And bioscience can predict little of future natural 
history. To the contrary, evolutionary theory neither predicts outcomes 
nor, looking back after the outcomes are known, retrodicts why this 
course of events occurred rather than thousands of others equally consis-
tent with the theory. 
Whatever their repetitions, each locality, each ecosystem is unique. No 
two waterfalls, mountains, beaches, bays, creeks, or maple trees are identi-
cal. Sometimes the differences are trivial and, even when notable, we may 
want to abstract out covering laws or general trends. Sometimes we think 
that the idiographic elements, punctuating the nomothetic elements, are 
noise in the system. But they are not really noise, they are news, good 
news—because this historical and topographic variation elevates nature 
into a territory for storied residence. 
Likewise, passing from science to ethics, philosophy can present no 
argument why these stories ought to have taken place. The best that I can 
give you is good stories, and hope that you can accept them for that. We 
may even come to love the epic, and prefer narrative over argument, over 
some theory by which natural history would follow as an inevitable con-
clusion, or even a statistically probable one. In that sense, neither science 
nor philosophy can present an argument that either necessitates or justi-
fies the existence of each (or any!) of the five million species with which 
we coinhabit Earth. But we can begin to sketch nesting sets of marvelous 
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tales. There is no logic with which to defend the existence of elephants or 
lotus flowers, squids or lemurs; but each enriches Earth's story. That 
alone is enough to justify their existence, 
Persons in Cultural History 
Natural history is necessary but not sufficient for cultural history; in non- 
human nature there are no persons. Persons live in cultural history, in 
which our humanity is constituted. Unlike coyotes or bats, humans are 
not just what they are by nature; they come into the world by nature 
quite unfinished and become what they become by culture. Being human 
is more than biochemistry, physiology, or ecology. Humans superimpose 
cultures on the wild nature out of which they once emerged. There is no 
greater drama than this long struggle (late in the evolutionary story) of 
the climb to humanity. If ever visitors from space were to file a report 
about Earth, volume one might cover the geological and biological phe-
nomena, volume two the anthropological and sociological events. 
Cultural history brings radical innovations. Information in wild nature 
travels intergenerationally on genes; information in culture travels neu- 
rally as persons are educated into transmissible cultures. The higher ani-
mals can learn limited behaviors from parents and conspecifics (as when 
birds, genetically disposed to migrate, imprint specific routes by follow-
ing the flock). Still, animals do not form cumulative transmissible cul-
tures. In nature, the coping skills are coded on chromosomes. In animals 
these may be expressed in the learning experiences of the phenotype. Off-
spring may model behavior after parents. But there are no longstanding 
and accumulating educational traditions, deliberately teaching the future 
generations. In culture, the skills are coded in craftsman's traditions, reli-
gious rituals, or technology manuals. Information acquired during an or-
ganism's lifetime is not transmitted genetically; the essence of culture is 
acquired information transmitted to the next generation. 
Information transfer in culture can be several orders of magnitude 
faster and overleap genetic lines. A typical couple in the modern world 
may have only two or three children, who inherit their genetic informa-
tion. But those children are educated by learning from dozens of friends 
and teachers, by reading hundreds of books, even, if they take a higher 
education, using libraries with tens of thousands of books, written by 
authors to whom they are genetically quite unrelated, who may have been 
dead for centuries. The children learn from newspapers and television 
programs with information coming from all over the world. 
A human being develops typically in some one of ten thousand cul-
tures, inheriting a heritage that is historically conditioned, perpetuated by 
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language, conventionally established, using symbols with locally effective 
meanings. Cultures exchange ideas; sometimes people are reared at the 
crossroads of cultures; well-educated persons choose and criticize their 
cultures. Animals are what they are genetically, instinctively, environ-
mentally, with few or no options in what they shall be at all, even if they 
do make some limited choices. They do not choose their careers, nor do 
they evaluate and espouse worldviews. Humans have myriads of lifestyle 
options, evidenced by their cultures; and each human makes daily deci-
sions that affect his or her character. 
Natural selection pressures are relaxed in culture; humans help each 
other out compassionately with charity; they insist on human rights. 
They study medicine to cure their diseases. The determinants of animal 
and plant behavior are never anthropological, political, economic, techno-
logical, scientific, philosophical, ethical, or religious. Animals do not hold 
elections and plan their environmental affairs; they do not make bulldoz-
ers to cut down tropical rainforests. They do not fund development proj-
ects through the World Bank, or contribute to funds to save the whales. 
They do not teach their religion to their children. They do not read or 
write articles wondering about their sense of place. 
Humans evolved out of nature, and that can confuse people into saying 
that humans are just natural, since their origins were natural. But that is 
to fall into a "nothing but" fallacy (the genetic fallacy), which confuses 
what a thing now essentially is with what its historical origins once were. 
This fallacy cannot take emergence seriously. We are animals, but with 
culture, and that gives us an exodus from mere nature. Humans are not 
like beasts immersed in a niche. In a sense modern humans have no ordi-
nary ecological niche at ail, The average bite of food eaten in the United 
States has travelled over 1,200 miles, for instance. The energy warming 
one's home may be from coal, and from sunshine hundreds of millions of 
years ago, or from nuclear power, splitting atoms fused in ancient stars. 
We could say that culture is the human niche, provided that we realize 
that the architectures of wild nature and of human culture are different. 
We face a dialectical truth; the thesis is nature, the antithesis is culture, 
and the synthesis is culture situated in nature, the two forming a home, a 
domicile (Greek: oikos, the root of ecology). That is our home territory. 
With culture now, as before with nature, I cannot give a scientific argu-
ment explaining how humans arrived, some logic by which the Earth 
story eventuates in Homo sapiens. No theory exists from which we follow 
as conclusions. And, passing again to ethics, I can give no argument why 
humans ought to be here. But I can invite you to appreciate the story that 
lies in, with, and under the Earth we inhabit, to enrich the story by telling 
it. Perhaps you may even come to prefer that role to a lesser one by which 
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humans are empirically necessary as outcomes of a determined process, 
or statistically probable as outcomes of stochastic process. 
The mission of historians is to tell these stories of peoples on their 
landscapes. That will be volume two in the Earth story. But humans are 
also the only species who can tell the natural history, volume one. A 
narrative role might make the story, and the human role in it, seem mean- 
ingful, despite the lack of sufficient logical premises or theory with which 
to reach the human presence as a conclusion. 
Persons in Natural History 
Animals are wholly absorbed into their niches, but humans can stand 
apart from the world and consider themselves in relation to it. Humans 
are, in this sense, eccentric to the world. Humans are only part of the 
world in biological and ecological senses, but they are the only part of the 
world that can orient themselves with respect to a critical theory of it. 
Humans can begin to comprehend what comprehends them; in this lies 
their paradox and responsibility. They have a distinct metaphysical status 
because only they can do metaphysics. The metaphysics humans do may 
lead them to experiences of unity with nature, to responsible care for 
other species, but such unity paradoxically puts humans beyond the rest 
of nature, where nothing else is capable of such philosophical experience 
and ethical caring. When humans assert the value of the global Earth and 
its creatures they exceed the animal scope of value. Thus the human ca-
pacity for a transcending overview of the whole imposes strange duties. 
Humans had relatively little biological role in naturally evolving eco-
systems, nor have they today such roles, in the sense that were they sub-
tracted from ancient African savannas or present Appalachian forests, 
those ecosystems would not be negatively affected. They are not some 
capstone species, pivotal in the ecosystems they inhabit. Humans are not 
important as predators or prey; they play little role in food chains or in 
regulating life cycles. They are a late add-on to the system; and, when 
they come, modify and disrupt their landscapes though they may, they 
hardly have an adapted fit analogously to the other species. Still, humans 
have a kind of eminence. 
Humans reach vast ranges of valuational experience unshared with the 
animals. If I am hiking with my dog and come to an overlook, we may 
both pause and enjoy the rest, but I can look at the scenery. He can look, 
but not at the view. Perhaps he smells what escapes my detection. But the 
human considers the canine perception, although not undergoing it, en-
joys the exercise, rest, and also the aesthetic experience, all in the midst of 
a worldview that sets a context of explanation for events in the view. The 
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animal has only its own horizon; the human can have multiple horizons, 
even a global horizon. In that sense, animals have a habitat; but humans 
have a world. The human has only a limited understanding of what is 
going on, but this is less limited than that of the dog and that establishes 
an advanced value richness. 
Humans should not "look down on" the "lower" orders of life, but 
humans alone can "look out over" or "look out for" other orders of life. 
They try to see where and who humans are, and comprehensively what 
others are. They have increasingly seen more of what there is to see, 
through the unfolding of art, literature, philosophy, natural history, sci-
ence. In this looking out, humans are the form of life in which valuational 
capacities are most (but not exclusively) developed. This is advanced ca-
pacity based on accident of birth. Humans drew human genes; monkeys 
got monkey genes. But this is also a kind of superiority based on evolu-
tionary achievement for which humans have to be grateful. It is no mark 
of intelligence or morality to refuse a value endowment. 
Humans ought to be moral overseers. Humans have oversight; they are 
worldviewers—today more than they have ever been before. Mind forms 
an intelligible view of the whole and defends the stories of life in all their 
forms. Interhuman ethics has spent the last two millennia waking up to 
human dignity. As we turn to a new millennium, environmental ethics 
invites awakening to the greater story of which humans are a consummate 
part. From this, morality follows as a corollary—more than before. This 
takes humans past resource use to residence and constrains their policy, 
economics, science, technology. Such dwelling takes us past questions of 
management of places we own to moral questions about well-placed 
goodness in communities we inhabit, both biotic and cultural. 
Humans can get "let in on" more value than any other kind of life. 
They can share the values of others and in this way be altruists. Animals 
have the capacity to see only from their niche; they have mere immanence. 
Humans can have a view from no niche, transcendence in immanence. 
Skeptics and relativists may say that humans just see from another niche, 
and it is certainly true that when humans appraise soil or timber as re-
sources, they see from within their niche. But humans also see other 
niches and the ecosystems that sustain niches; they study warblers or see 
Earth from space. Humans are, if we may play on words, spectacular be-
cause they emerge to see the spectacle they are in. Humans ought to be 
spirit incarnate in place. 
These cultural and moral options introduce the possibility of going 
astray, of making mistakes, of falling into tragedy. Humans make their 
own history, beyond biology, but this is not always to praise humans 
and belittle beasts. Humans have a superiority of opportunity, capacities 
unattained in animal life. Alas, however, the human capacity is forever 
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unattained, brokenly attained, Much of the history that humans have 
made is sordid enough. There are good moments, noble achievements; 
but all too often humans stand condemned because they could and ought 
to have made for themselves better history than they did. If humans were 
biologically constrained in their history, if they could not do otherwise 
by nature, then they ought not be so censured. But humans are the beasts 
made to image God and fallen into sin—so the classical monotheist view 
of ourselves put it. 
That sin is pride, and here we can enlarge the insight of the classical 
theologians. Traditional, anthropocentric ethics has tried to make humans 
the sole loci of value, transcending the otherwise valueless world. But this 
stunts humanity because it does not know genuine human transcen-
dence—a transcending overview caring for the others. Humans, with their 
intrinsic worth, which features moral agency, double back on the world 
out of which they have emerged. Humans use their excellent rationality 
as a survival tool for defending the human form of life; they build culture, 
for better or for worse. But rationality, conscience, and emotions can do 
more than give integrity, excellence, self-esteem, and satisfaction, the vari-
ous "virtues" we seek in our personal lives. These gifts ought to lead to a 
further transcendence that defends life in all its forms, to a stewardship 
over creation. 
The Home Planet 
This is the home planet. Views of Earth from space have given us an 
emerging vision of Earth and the place of human life on it. Leaving home, 
we discover how precious this Earth place is. The distance lends enchant-
ment, brings us home again. The distance helps us to get real. We get put 
in our place. A virtually unanimous experience of the hundred or more 
astronauts, from many countries and cultures, is the awe experienced at 
the first sight of the whole Earth—its beauty, fertility, smallness in the 
abyss of space, light and warmth under the sun in surrounding darkness. 
The astronauts are earthstruck. 
They are struck not only with the beauty and fertility of this, their 
home place, but with its fragility. The late-coming, moral species, Homo 
sapiens, has still more lately gained startling powers for the rebuilding and 
modification, including the degradation, of this home territory. Perhaps 
the four most critical issues that humans currently face are peace, popula-
tion, development, and environment. Earth is the only planet with an 
ecology, the only planet that is a home; and, on Earth, home to several 
million species, humans are the only species of moral agents. Ethics has 
been almost entirely interhuman ethics, persons finding a way to relate 
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morally to other persons.  But ethics too is now troubled, anxious about 
the troubled planet. 
We worried throughout most of this century, the first century of great 
world wars, that humans would destroy themselves in interhuman con- 
flict. Fortunately, that fear has subsided. Unfortunately, it is rapidly being 
replaced by a new one. The worry for the next century is that humans 
may destroy their planet and themselves with it. We are turning a millen-
nium. The challenge of the next millennium is to contain those cultures 
within the carrying capacity of the larger community of life in our bio-
sphere. To continue the development pace of the last century for another 
millennium will produce sure disaster. If we humans are true to our spe-
cies epithet, "the wise species" needs an Earth ethics, one that discovers 
a global sense of obligation to this whole inhabited planet. 
We need to lift our horizons from living politically to living ecologi-
cally. Once the mark of an educated person could be summed up as civi- 
tas, the privileges, rights, responsibilities of citizenship. People ought to 
be good citizens, productive in their communities, leaders in business, 
the professions, government, church, education. That appropriated, and 
appropriately transmitted and developed, one's historical cultural lineage. 
But the mark of an educated person is today something more. It is not 
enough to be a good "citizen." It is not enough even to be "international" 
because neither of those terms have enough "nature" or "earthiness" in 
them. "Citizen" is only half the truth; the other half is that we are resi-
dents" dwelling on landscapes. We are natives on Earth. Our responsibil-
ity to Earth might be thought the most remote of our responsibilities; it 
seems so grandiose and vague beside our concrete responsibilities to our 
children or next door neighbors. But not so: the other way round, it is 
the most fundamental, the most comprehensive of our responsibilities. 
We can hardly be responsible to anything more cosmic—unless perhaps 
to the divine Ground of Being. 
An ethics about dirt? That is sometimes taken to be the ultimate reduc- 
tio ad absurdum in environmental ethics. Put like that, we have to agree. 
A clod of dirt, just some earth (spelled with the lower case "e") has little 
or no intrinsic value, nor do we have duties to it. But when we go from 
earth to Earth, from dirt to the prolific planetary system of which it is 
part, perspectives change. Earth is Mother Earth, the womb out of which 
we come and which we never really leave. Dealing with an acre or two of 
real estate, perhaps even with hundreds or thousands of acres, we can 
think that this earth belongs to us. But on the global scale, Earth is not 
something we own. Earth does not belong to us; rather we belong to it. 
We belong on it. The question is not of property, but of community. The 
vision of human life we ought to seek is not that of maximum exploitation 
of Earth as a big property resource; it is that of valued residence in a 
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created community of life. In that sense, an Earth ethics is not the reductio 
ad absurdum of silly and peripheral concern about squirrels and flowers, 
extrapolated to rocks and dirt. To the contrary, it is an urgent world vi-
sion. It is ultimate concern about our home territory. 
When we say that Earth is valuable in a humanistic perspective, we 
mean that it is a resource for people who are able to value it instrumen- 
tally in myriads of ways. Earth is so valuable that humans have a right to 
an environment with integrity. But when we say that Earth is valuable in 
an ecological perspective, we mean that Earth is a place able to produce 
value, and has long been doing so as an evolutionary ecosystem. A late 
though remarkable product of the place-process is humans, who are also 
valuable—of value in an advanced way. When humans come, they find 
Earth often valuable, able to satisfy preferences, able to produce valued 
experiences. The subjective value events are a subset—perhaps a capstone 
subset but still a superposed subset—of the larger, objective production 
and support of natural values. Our responsibility is to find our role both 
benefiting from and conserving this community of life. Earth is indeed a 
storied place. 
Home Places 
Creating a global ethic, and epic, of place may seem to require too ad-
vanced an appreciation of natural history, too much scientific education, 
skills well past the capacities of most of Earth's residents. Only a minority 
of humans have had, or can have, such a global overview; most persons in 
their built environments live most of the time with little sense of evolu-
tionary time, hardly even with a sense of ecological time over the decades 
of succession and change on landscapes. Most persons are not world trav-
elers, not cosmopolitan citizens. Can we bring the sense of global resi-
dence, needed on planetary scales, also into focus at native range? What 
is the logic of residence in a more local territory? 
Even though we think globally, we have to live locally. Residence in a 
local environment senses the recurrent universals particularly displayed in 
that place—the seasons, the soil, the wind, the rain, the sun, the biological 
powers regenerating the landscape, the native fauna and flora, the propor-
tions of time and place. One enjoys these perennial givens exemplified in 
local areas. A person in his or her biography—as much as a scientist col-
lecting herbarium specimens or peering through a microscope—is a detec-
tion device for catching something of the richness and integrity of what 
is taking place on the landscape he or she moves through. In this sense, 
every person can and ought to live geographically, optimizing one's expe-
rience of place. 
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An environmental philosophy does not want merely to abstract out 
laws and universals, if such there are, from all this drama of life, formulat-
ing some set of duties applicable across the whole. True, an environmental 
ethics demands a theory of the whole, an overview of Earth, but not a 
unity that destroys plurality. We also want an ethic colored by the agent's 
own history, cultural identification, personal experiences, and choices. 
The moral point of view must belong to a proper-named person who lives 
in a particular place. An ethic has to be instantiated in individuals, who 
live biographies, each with their local geography. Here, finally, intensely, 
intimately, we want to continue the logic of storied residence. 
Ethics must be written in theory with universal intent, but the theory 
must permit and require ethics to be lived in practice in the first person 
singular. The logic of the home, the ecology, is finally narrative, and 
human life will not be a disembodied reason but a person organic in his-
tory in some particular time and place. In dialectic with what was claimed 
before, now we specify an ideal of humans inseparably entwined with 
particular times and places. If a holistic ethic is really to incorporate the 
whole story, it must systematically embed itself in historical eventfulness. 
No two human careers are identical because over historical time cul-
tures change and because genetic sets, choices, circumstances, and contin-
gencies differ. Endlessly singular human subjects confront an endlessly 
singular environment. The practical, applied character of environmental 
ethics will have to recognize this singularity if it is to do justice to the 
form of the world and of human life in it. These story lines are not simply 
found; they must also be constructed. Humans want a storied residence 
in nature where the passage of time integrates past, present, and future in 
a meaningful career. This does not make nature mere instrument in a 
human story, any more than it makes the fellow persons in our drama 
merely tools. Rather, we have reached the richest possible concept of life 
in community, where all the actors contribute to storied residence. 
Complementing now the global oversight considered earlier, we seek a 
local view, living participant stories in time and place. We must comple-
ment transcendence with immanence. Humans are not to be free from 
their environment but to be free in their environment. An environmental 
ethic needs roots in locality and in specific appreciation of natural kinds— 
not always rooted in a single place, but moving through particular regions 
and tracks of nature so as to make a narrative career. Life will include its 
adventures in natural history. Our role is to live out a space time, place 
time ethic, interpreting our landscapes and choosing our loves within 
those landscapes. We endorse the world with our signatures. This is, ulti-
mately, what the evolutionary epic has been about, now consummated in 
environmental ethics, an adventure in the love of life and in increasing 
freedom in one's environment, entwined in biotic community. 
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Living Stories in Place 
An ethic in the sense we are developing it is a creative act, not simply the 
discovery and following of rules and duties. It is writing an appropriate 
part of an ongoing story. In this dimension, your career is one of environ-
mental interpretation. Life has, and ought to have, other dimensions: a 
family ethic, a business ethic, a community ethic; but the moral life is not 
complete without a sensitive approach to one's place—to the fauna, the 
flora, the geomorphology surrounding one's life. A person's role is to 
enrich his or her environment by appreciating it. A person's role is to be 
a moral geographer. Persons are consciousness in place; they always have 
a location. Persons are place become conscious of itself. In that sense, 
biography that is lived as historical geography is the only possible argu-
ment for life. 
Note 
This is an apologia; I am taking up a view of the world, and inviting others 
to share it. The style and format embody the argument, as existential as it 
is academic. I am searching for a sense of place. An ethic must be lived; 
humans are persons incarnate in the world; they are who they are where 
they are. The challenge in environmental philosophy, and the opportu-
nity in relating philosophy to geography, is to get persons intelligently 
both naturalized and socialized. Only then will we realize the distinctive 
human genius, the promise and the power of the human spirit on Earth. 
